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IntroductIon
In the classical Greek world, in the context of the polis, the taxation of sale 
was the kind of banality that could attract the wit of Aristophanes.1 Yet it is 
precisely this sort of everyday occurrence about which most of our sources 
are silent. Indeed, if we can assume that, broadly speaking, the classical polis 
and its Hellenistic successor raised a tax on certain sales, a tax which they 
called an epônion or a hekatostê (1/100), we are ill informed about the details: 
the incidence of this tax and the mode of imposition.2 With the subjugation, 
and further, the integration of many poleis into Hellenistic kingdoms, as well 
as the kings’ foundation of many new cities organized along similar lines, 
fiscality became a domain in which relations of power were negotiated, and 
in which, for us, the smaller polity’s position in a larger, multiscalar state can 
be mapped out. Yet when it comes to taxation and sale, we do not yet have 
a clear account of the impact of royal power (basileia) on the polis: which 
1 Acharnians 896-97.
2 On sales tax in the Greek city of the classical and Hellenistic periods, see francotte 1909, 15-19 
and andreades 1933, 144-46. Independent Delos represents a singular case, for which we have an 
extraordinary amount of information; see chanKoWsKI 2007, 311-12.
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of the traditional tax powers of the polis were transferred to the monarchy? 
Which were shared? Which transformed in the new environment? Or did the 
kings introduce new fiscal categories and institutions around sale in order to 
increase their revenues?
What follows is an attempt to clarify the role of basileia in shaping sale. 
In reviewing the evidence from the major kingdoms outside of Egypt, a sur-
prisingly circumscribed royal role in the taxation of the sale transaction is 
uncovered.3 By contrast, a modest royal role comes into focus in the charging 
of fees for access to the spaces of sale par excellence, the agora and the tempo-
rary marketplaces of festivals, and an even larger role in shaping sale through 
taxation in the domain of customs, in the taxation of mobility, specifically, 
mobility in the service of sale. These conclusions are the basis for the recon-
struction of what Nicholas Purcell has called in his recent Sather Lectures a 
“universe of sale,” or a “regime of sale,” which Purcell argues is historically 
variable and contingent.4 In particular, the aim is to broach the question of the 
political and economic integration of a Hellenistic kingdom through the lens 
of the institutional arrangement for sale.
Part I, “transactIons”
In common usage, the term “sales tax” refers to a transaction tax, and in the 
American system, it is usually incumbent upon the buyer to pay it.5 In the 
simplest terms, when we speak of a “sales tax,” we are referring to a species 
of indirect taxation, namely that which is levied on the act of sale.6 Such a 
3 The Ptolemaic kingdom is excluded from this study due to considerations of space and because 
much of the focus will be on a dynamic interaction between cities and kings not found in Egypt.
4 The lectures were entitled, “Venal Histories: The Character, Limits, and Historical Importance of 
Buying and Selling in the Ancient World.” For now, see Purcell 2012.
5 From West’s Tax Law Dictionary (accessed online, 9.24.12), s.v., “sales tax”: “State or local tax on 
the retail sale of goods or services. In general, it is calculated as a percentage of the sales price. Sales tax 
paid or accrued in carrying on a trade or business or as expenses for the production of income is allowed 
as a deduction. Sales taxes are generally paid by buyers and collected by sellers as agents for the 
government.” By contrast, in ancient Greece, it seems to have been less clear who should have to pay 
the epônion. See, e.g., the case of the land sales of fourth-century Philippi (hatzoPoulos 1996, 83).
6 Some historians, however, are willing to apply the label “sales tax” even when it is not clear 
that the imposition strikes directly upon the transaction as such. A good example is the case of a 
document describing taxes for the synoikism of Teos and Kyrbissos, the inscription from Olamış. 
(robert – robert 1976, 176-79, esp. lines 8-15), as analyzed by chanKoWsKI 2007, 310-11. 
Though she applies the label “taxes sur les ventes,” she also admits that by its mode of imposition, 
that tax looks more like a cheironaxion, a tax on practicing a particular form of economic activity. 
Specifically, slaves who sell certain products are not taxable possessions of their owners.
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tax is well evidenced in the Hellenistic polis, and it is also attested for cities 
joined together in a federal league (koinon).7 By contrast, our evidence for a 
royal sales tax outside of Egypt is sparse and ambiguous. Before examining 
the situation on the ground, it may be helpful to review what theoretical re-
flections are available in the second book of the Oikonomika of Ps.-Aristotle.8 
Tellingly, the author of that text leaves no place for a sales tax in his diagram 
of the royal oikonomia. However, one has been tempted to identify a sales 
tax among the enumerated satrapal revenues. The fourth satrapal revenue is 
termed ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τῆν γῆν τε καὶ ἀγοραίων τελῶν γινομένη (2.1.4 = 
1345b). After significant disagreement, most now agree on the meaning of the 
first part of this clause: these are customs and tolls, specifically, those levied 
on goods and people travelling over land (kata tên gên), as opposed to those 
arriving in harbors, which belong to the third satrapal revenue, τῶν ἐμπορίων, 
mentioned just before.9 The agoraia telê are rather more difficult to interpret. 
They are undoubtedly market taxes of some sort, but the institutional reality 
behind the phrase is unclear.10 The most notable attempt to interpret agoraia 
telê as sales taxes is that of Makis Aperghis. He has gone so far as to restore 
the phrase in the correspondence between the city of Herakleia-under-Latmos 
and Antiochos III and translate it as such.11 Not only does this translation lack 
philological justification, it fails to make sense of the pairing of the agoraia 
telê with those taxes raised kata tên gên. The conceptual link seems to relate 
to the movement of people and goods from ports of entry to markets by way 
of transportation over land. This would mean that what is being taxed is the 
conveyance of marketable goods to the market itself. The agoraia telê should 
be understood primarily as charges for access to market space (French “droits 
de marché”), and possibly also as taxes on movement in the service of sale.
7 For examples from the Hellenistic polis, see andreades 1933, 144-46; for sales tax divided up 
between a federal league and its constituent member poleis, see, e.g., the case of the Akarnanian 
koinon, IG IX,12 583.
8 On the date of this text: against the low dating of Aperghis 2004 (early third century B.C.E.), see 
now valente 2011, with date of 320-300. The traditional high date gives the text a late Achaemenid 
background while making sense of the occasional early Hellenistic elements.
9 chanKoWKsI 2007, 308.
10 Cf. van GronIGen – Wartelle 1968, in the Budé edition, “[impôts] sur les marchés,” to 
zoePffel 2006, 22, “Marktsteuern,” to valente 2011, ad loc., who waffles between a tax on 
“merci” and on “mercati.” See also chanKoWsKI 2007, 308: “taxes commerciales en dehors des 
zones portuaires.” rostovtzeff 1941, 444-45, admits the difficulty, but settles on “all kinds of taxes 
on sales, taxes on the registration of documents, and so forth.” Cf. mceWan 1988, 417, who suggests 
that behind the Akkadian “tax of the market” in cuneiform documents we have a Greek epônion.
11 SEG 37,859 N II, line 16. aPerGhIs 2004, 160-63, esp. 160 for restoration, which does not 
appear in his edition in the appendix. 
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a) The Attalids
One of the likeliest candidates for a royal sales tax is the agoranomia of To-
riaion in the Attalid kingdom. In the years following the enlargement of that 
kingdom in 188 B.C.E., the village community of Toriaion in eastern Phrygia 
requested and was granted a number of polis institutions by Eumenes II. Two 
royal letters to the new polis have been preserved in an inscription, describ-
ing these privileges in detail.12 Of particular importance is Eumenes’ grant to 
Toriaion of an oil fund for the gymnasium, for which the king assigns – for the 
present – the “revenue from the agoranomia (τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγορανομ[ί]ας 
πρόσοδον)” (line 43). It is difficult to determine very precisely the character 
of this revenue, not least because the term agoranomia itself is rare.13 Yet it 
seems reasonable to assume that what is meant here is revenue collected by 
the agoranomoi. The question is what kind of revenue that might be. Accord-
ing to the document’s first editors, Lloyd Jonnes and Marijana Ricl, this is 
revenue, “the bulk of which came from taxes on sales.”14 More recently, Lau-
rent Capdetrey and Claire Hasenhohr have led a detailed investigation of the 
office of agoranomos, which contains the first full treatment of its finances. 
Unfortunately, we are better informed of the sources of an agoranomia that is 
cobbled together from extraneous public funds than we are of an agoranomia 
that derives from the activities of the agoranomoi themselves. As Capdetrey 
and Hasenhohr insist, those activities will have varied greatly from place to 
place, but in their view, these are not only the exaction of fines, but also the 
collection of taxes on transactions.15 Yet as it stands, so much more of the 
documentation relates to fines.16 Key texts such as the Agoranomic Inscription 
of the Piraeus or the Delian Law on Charcoal and Wood tend to show the ago-
ranomoi acting rather more to monitor prices than to collect taxes on sales.17
12 SEG 47,1745.
13 E.g., I.Magnesia 269; I.Iznik 1260; I.Pergamon 183.
14 Jonnes – rIcl 1997, 24.
15 caPdetrey – hasenohr 2012, 14.
16 As emphasized by dmItrIev 2005, 34. bresson 2008, 22, summarizes the duties of the 
agoranomoi in the following way: “de veiller à la régularité des transactions effectuées sur le 
marché.” Similarly, see mIGeotte 2005, esp. p. 288. For classical Athens, see rhodes 1993, 575-
76. Note, P. stanley 1976, in his unpublished dissertation Ancient Greek Market Regulations and 
Controls (Berkeley), p. 205, suggests that agoranomoi collected a sales tax in classical Athens; for 
Hellenistic Athens, see IG II2 1013. There is a documented fiscal role for agoranomoi, which is not 
tax collection, but rather involves selling contracts for public works (e.g., I.Erythrai 503, lines 27-29 
[misunderstood by Jones and Ricl]), monitoring holders of tax privileges (I. Delos 509), or managing 
market space (LSCG 65, line 101).
17 For the Piraeus inscription, see steInhauer 1994, with bresson 2000, 151-82; the Delian law: 
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If indeed the agoranomia of Toriaion did consist of at least in part a sales 
tax, it is however significant that what we see in the case of this nascent polis 
is not a permanent royal sales tax, but a temporary royal appropriation of a 
civic tax to shore up a local institution. The insistence of Eumenes II that the 
arrangement is provisional is noteworthy.18 In the long term, it is clear that 
royal revenues are envisioned for this earmark.19 This was because in the ma-
jor Hellenistic kingdoms outside of Egypt, the office of agoranomos remained 
a civic office.20 This is nicely illustrated by a text from Ilion, which shows the 
member poleis of the koinon of Athena Ilias each contributing one agorano-
mos apiece to the college that would oversee a festival market.21 In Toriaion, 
the Attalids may have for a time laid their hands on a sales tax, but it was by 
no means one that regularly accrued to the royal fisc.22
Strabo famously describes the commerce of a religious festival, the panê-
gyris, in pithy terms: ἥ τε πανήγυρις ἐμπορικόν τι πραγμά ἐστιν, “the panê-
gyris is a commerical affair.”23 So-called big-ticket items, especially slaves 
and livestock, were bought and sold at these festivals in large quantities.24 The 
space and temporal context for sale were strictly demarcated, greatly facilitat-
ing surveillance and taxation, whether by religious authorities acting on their 
own or in concert with states. Thus, the panêgyris, particularly where we find 
royal involvement, is a plausible context in which to look for a royal sales tax. 
As Christophe Chandezon has pointed out, we have mostly a negative image 
of the fiscal norms of these fairs, as the documents are so often concerned with 
blanket grants of tax immunity (ateleia pantôn).25 Seen in this light, a second 
Attalid document is of great interest. This is the letter of the future Attalos 
II concerning the katoikoi of Apollo Tarsênos.26 These katoikoi were likely 
a population of temple dependents on or around a sacred estate in the upper 
I.Delos 509.
18 caPdetrey – hasenohr 2012, 23, n. 98, underscore the point.
19 SEG 47,1745, lines 43-47. For interpretations of precisely which royal revenues are meant, see 
most recently schuler 2004, 535, n. 194 and müller 2005, 356-58.
20 G. Finkelstein has challenged this axiom. fInKIelsteJn 2003, 472 suggests that Antiochos 
IV, perhaps influenced by Ptolemaic practice, instituted a form of joint administration of the civic 
agoranomia. 
21 I.Ilion 3, lines 5-11.
22 Contra also aPerGhIs 2004, 285, on SEG 47,1745, RC 3 (clause 11), and 2 Macc. 3, 4-6. Note 
also that agoranomia does not appear in all manuscripts of 2 Macc., for which see abel 1949, 317.
23 Strabo 10.5.4.
24 See, e.g., sales tax in the aforementioned IG IX,12 583 (Anaktorion and the Akarnanian koinon).
25 chandezon 2000.
26 RC 47.
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Kaikos Valley, in the hinterland of Pergamon. Through the intercession of 
their high priest, they secured a tax privilege from the crown termed ateleia 
probatôn, “tax immunity on livestock.” At first glance, this would appear to be 
a direct tax on property in livestock.27 However, the scholarly consensus has in 
fact settled on sales tax.28 This is largely on the basis of two restorations made 
after a suggestion of Louis Robert, (which he seems, in the end, to have taken 
back).29 These are πανηγύρεως in line 4 and π̣ανή̣γ̣υ̣ρ̣ι̣ν̣ in line 12.30 The 
standard interpretation, then, is that these were livestock sold at the festival 
of Apollo Tarsênos. Leaving aside the problem of a definitive restoration of 
the text, we still face an interpretive problem. Was the tax immunity granted 
on the import of the livestock across royal customs boundaries to the site of 
the festival, or rather, was it a true royal sales tax, levied on transactions? The 
Apollo Tarsênos document is not so much the hard proof of a royal sales tax 
that it is often said to be, but a hint of how much we do not know.31 Again, 
for festivals, we only hear of the kings’ releasing from taxation, i.e., the ad 
hoc grants – the exceptions to the norm. So much of the royal role in sale is 
obscure.32 Yet it merits emphasis: the Attalid grant to the katoikoi of Apollo 
Tarsênos remains imperfectly understood from this perspective.
b) The Seleukids
From the Seleukid kingdom, the prime epigraphical evidence for a royal sales 
tax comes from the dossier of letters of Antiochos III and his governor Zeuxis 
to the city of Herakleia-under-Latmos, dated c. 196-193.33 The documents 
emerged from negotiations over the terms of imperial rule that followed An-
tiochos III’s expansion and consolidation of his power in Asia Minor. In the 
letter of Zeuxis, the king’s representative reproduces the original petition of 
27 Cf. robert – robert 1976, 176-79, lines 8-9, the synoikism of Teos and Kyrbissos, where a tax 
tôn probatôn is clearly not a sales tax but a head tax.
28 chandezon 2003, 196, though cf. 315, allowing for the possibility that it is a head tax; PIeJKo 
1989, 400; schuler 1998, 193: “Verkaufsteuer auf Schafe, von der Festmarkt befreit werden sollte.”
29 See Welles 1934, 193.
30 WIlhelm 1943, 35-40 and 61, as well as feyel 1940, 137-41. Welles also considered and ruled 
out in line 6: [ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρε]σιν.
31 Cf. the case of Herakleia-under-Latmos SEG 37,859, N4 line 6. What does it mean that the 
panêgyris there is atelês? As Wörrle 1988, 467, admits, we simply do not know.
32 One thinks here of a royal judge set over Attalid Aeolis (Athenaios XV 697d), who may have an 
analogue in the basilikoi dikastai of Tyrissa, a Macedonian city under Antigonid rule (SEG 47,999, 
lines 5-7). In Tyrissa, the judges’ ruling is followed by an act of sale.
33 SEG 37,859.
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Herakleia, which is full of requests for various fiscal privileges. Of relevance 
here is the request in lines 7-8 of N III that tax immunity be granted on some-
thing τοῦ τε εἰσαγομένου εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῦ πωλουμένου. Following 
the commentary of Michael Wörrle, one usually supplies σίτου (“of grain”), 
from the previous clause. Yet what of τοῦ πωλουμένου? Is this not evidence 
of a royal sales tax, as some have claimed?34 And is it not the case here that 
the tax immunity is requested, first, for the import of grain, and second, for 
its sale?
This is a very difficult passage to interpret precisely, but it seems to speak 
not of royal sales tax, but of a customs regime that anticipates sale. This be-
comes clear if we pay close attention to its context. This entire section, three 
requests following the verb μνησθησομένους in line 6, concerns the city’s 
provision of grain.35 Earlier, Herakleia had complained of distress (steno-
chôria; N II lines 12-13).36 To resolve, the issue, some grain was to be given 
to Herakleia as a gift (dôrea; NII line 7). But for the reconstitution of the rest 
of its grain supply, Herakleia needed to consider the tax implications, espe-
cially if it wanted to import, via private or publically designated importers, 
grain that might then be sold publically. So Herakleia asked for a package of 
ateleia, several privileges that were not in fact mutually exclusive, but togeth-
er would ensure the tax-free transfer of grain across a royal customs bound-
ary, irrespective of the method of its eventual distribution. The city requested 
ἀτελεία{ν} τοῦ τε εἰσαγομένου εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῦ πωλουμένου καὶ 
ἵνα οἱ ἐξάγοντες ἐκ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τὰς ἰδίας χρείας 
καὶ εἰς πρᾶσιν ἀτελεῖς ὦσιν, (tax immunity to be granted both on (grain) 
imported into the city and on grain (to be) sold there, and that those export-
ing (grain) from the king’s land into the city, both for their personal use and 
for the purpose of sale, do so tax free…” (N III lines 7-9)). Significantly, the 
question of sale is sandwiched between considerations of customs. This is 
because it was from the perspective of customs that sale was at issue for the 
royal fiscal authority. We should understand τοῦ πωλουμένου to mean that 
34 Notably, ma 1999, 132: tax on “import and sale of grain within the city.” Cf. 343, with n.7, 
where Ma is more circumspect in his epigraphical dossier, reproducing Wörrle’s translation, but 
allowing for the possibility that the phrase refers to “all imports and sales in the city τὸ εἰσαγόμενον 
καὶ τὸ πωλούμενον.” See also Aperghis 2004, 161, which makes of the phrase τοῦ τε εἰσαγομένου 
εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῦ πωλουμένου, in effect, two different kinds of taxable grain: Herakleia 
requests that “tax exemption (be granted both) on that imported into the city and that sold there.” For 
Aperghis, then, the release granted is from a royal sales tax collected in the city’s market.
35 See the discussion of Wörrle 1988, 467-68; and also the opinion of GauthIer 1989a, 405: all 
three demands have the same object, namely, grain. 
36 See GauthIer 1989a, 404, for emphasis on “dénouement.” Wörrle had translated stenochôria 
as “Landnot.”
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tax immunity was to be granted on grain that was imported for the purpose 
of sale, the eis prasin of the third and final clause, and not on the sale of that 
grain per se.37 The whole passage concerns customs collected at boundaries 
and not the surveillance of transactions conducted in the agora.38
Much more resolute indications that the Seleukids taxed sales, especially 
the so-called big-ticket sales, come from the Near East. Indeed, the farther 
one moves east in the kingdom, the more evidence there seems to be for royal 
involvement in the taxation of sale. However, in the case of Jerusalem, there 
is in fact nothing that concerns sales tax in the letter of Antiochos III to that 
city preserved by Josephus.39 The richest sources of information come from 
Babylonia, in the form of cuneiform tablets and clay sealings.40 In Seleucia-
on-the-Tigris, Nippur, and Uruk, clay sealings have been recovered that bear 
in Greek the names of certain taxes, andropodikê (slave tax), halikê (salt tax), 
and indeed, epônion, often in combination, and often alongside the title of a 
royal official, the chreophylax, who registered contracts at least in part for the 
purpose of taxation.41 Further, from Uruk, we also possess cuneiform tablets 
that record sale contracts. These tablets come from temple archives, but they 
often allude to duplicate registration of the same sales in royal archives. While 
the relationships of the different archives to one another remains in dispute, 
especially since they seem to change over time, the interest of the crown in 
taxing sale through registration of contracts is patent.42 In Uruk, the Seleuc-
ids even took an interest in certain sales that concerned solely temple affairs, 
namely, the sale of prebend contracts.43 It may even be that part of the impetus 
for the organization of certain segments of the populations of these cities into 
37 We know very well that grain schemes in Greek cities involved public sale of grain stores and 
royal gifts of grain. See Wörrle 1988, 467.
38 Pace caPdetrey 2007, 421. Cf. chanKoWsKI 2007: “Sur ces transactions, le pouvoir royal 
semblait être normalement habilité à prélever, logiquement, une taxe d’importation et de vente (par 
exemple une dekatè tou sitou?) lors des ventes dans la cité, et une taxe d’ exportation auprès des 
marchands qui venaient le chercher dans le domaine royal.”
39 AJ 12.138-44. Contra aPerGhIs 2004, 167; however, for Seleukid Judaea, see also the intriguing 
mention of the “price of salt (τῆς τιμῆς τοῦ ἀλὸς)” in 1 Macc. 10, 29. The context however is the 
letter of Demetrios I to Jonathan, which included an extraordinary set of fiscal privileges that were 
in fact never taken up. I am skeptical about the use of this document for the fiscal history of the 
Seleukid kingdom.
40 The sealings from Uruk and Seleucia-on-the-Tigris were first studied by rostovtzeff 1932; for 
the cuneiform tablets from Uruk, see doty 1977; mceWan 1988; doty 2012. The final excavation 
publication for both the sealings and the tablets from Uruk is lIndström 2003. See also the important 
essay of Joannès 2012, incorporating a reassessment of the context of the finds. 
41 On the chreophylax in Seleukid royal administration, see caPdetrey 2007, 319-20.
42 On the administrative practice operative in Uruk and Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, see messIna 2005.
43 Joannès 2012, 249. Sale is also at issue in Falaika: Iscrizione dello Estremo Oriente 422, line 33.
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communities based on the model of the polis, like the famous pulitei/politai of 
Babylon, was a desire to evade precisely such exactions.44
c) Cassander and Cassandreia
The case of Cassander and the city of Cassandreia is of distinct importance as 
it throws in high relief the question of whether a king might limit a city’s abil-
ity to tax sale. This is a complicated case that concerns a royal grant of ateleia 
made by Cassander to a man named Chairephanes, c. 306-298 B.C.E.45 But the 
city of Cassandreia plays a major role too: the decree is dated by the name of 
its eponymous magistrate, and the inscription was likely set up in Cassandreia, 
probably before one of its major public buildings. 46 In fact, the Chairephanes 
decree is one of several royal grants, the others being land grants, from the 
vicinity of the site of Cassandreia, which have spurred a lively debate about 
the nature of this polis, Cassander’s massive synoikism and royal capital in the 
Chalikidic peninsula, its political status, institutions, and sovereignty.47 What 
distinguishes the grant to Chairephanes from those other grants is both that it 
concerns only ateleia, and also that Chairephanes, curiously, seems to be a 
citizen of Cassandreia, at least this is what his gentilicial implies.
The ateleia granted to Chairephanes and his descendants includes import 
and export, buying and selling, provided that they are not done ep’emporiai 
(καὶ εἰσάγοντι καὶ ἐξάγοντι καὶ πωλοῦντι καὶ ὠνουμένωι πλὴν ὅσα ἐπ’ 
ἐμπορίαι (lines 7-11)). In publishing the inscription, I. Vokotopoulou took 
ἐπ’ ἐμπορίαι, effectively, as a locative. On this understanding, these activi-
ties were tax-free provided that they did not take place in one of Cassandreia’s 
two harbors.48 Yet as has been recognized, πλὴν ὅσα ἐπ’ ἐμπορίαι is a dif-
ferent way of saying epi ktêsei – i.e., what is not for exchange in commerce is 
for possession.49 As it happens, in another grant of Cassander, this one to the 
Macedonian landholder Perdiccas, dated to the very same year and quite pos-
44 On these communities and the potential for their fiscal interests to diverge from their neighbors’, 
see clancIer 2007, 56-59.
45 SEG 47,940.
46 On the question of the location of the asty of Cassandreia and the architectural context for the 
Chairephanes decree, see voKotoPoulou 1997, 48-49.
47 The other grants are Cassander’s to Perdiccas (SEG 36,626) and Lysimachus’ to Limnaios (SEG 
38,619). For the debate, see voKotoPoulou 1997; hatzoPoulos 1998, 621-22; bresson 2007, 
173.
48 voKotoPoulou 1997, 47. Yet the activity of emporia need not be exclusively “το κάτα 
θάλασσα εμπόριο.” See Aristotle, Politics 1258b 22, 3.
49 See bresson 2007, 117.
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sibly from the very same architectural context, the right of ateleia for import 
and export is granted by the king ἐπὶ κτήσει.50 At stake was the purpose of the 
exchange, not its location.
What then is the anxiety expressed by such a proviso? Though probably 
a citizen, Chairephanes, like Perdiccas, would have been an outsized figure 
in Cassandreia. Considerations of social status and of the unusual scale of 
his economic activity may have trumped the normative claims of citizenship, 
especially if this Chairephanes is to be identified with the man who undertook 
a major project of land reclamation in Euboea.51
Like Perdiccas, Chairephanes probably owned an estate in the city’s ter-
ritory. The management of such an estate, service to the king, and private 
interests abroad would have necessitated much coming and going, as well as 
buying and selling for the maintenance of a large oikos. In fact, many compa-
rable grants contain language that is explicit on this score: one is permitted to 
import and export eis ton idion oikon, (for one’s own household).52 It seems 
that the aim of the grant was the protection of these extraordinary activities 
– to ensure that Chairephanes was taxed just like any other citizen of Cassan-
dreia. The royal grants to Perdiccas and Chairephanes were directed at local 
officials, civic ones if they were operating in the agora of Cassandreia, and 
perhaps royal ones as well, who might have operated near the inland borders 
of the city’s territory and also in its harbors. In terms of sale, the point was to 
give Chairephanes the opportunity to claim in the agora of Cassandreia that 
his buying and selling in usual volume was done “for possession.” Thus in 
the grant, Cassander was not affirming, by renouncing it, his right to raise a 
sales tax in the polis of Cassandreia.53 He was not so much taking away the 
city’s right to raise a sales tax, but rather insisting, in a heavy-handed way, 
that Cassandreia tax its extraordinary (new?) citizen in merely the ordinary 
manner.54
In general, when it came to the transaction of sale itself, within these king-
doms, in the absence of a temple community, it was the cities that seem to have 
exercised the primary tax powers. It might be suggested that if we possessed 
50 SEG 36,626, lines 29-31.
51 On Chairephanes’ possible interests abroad, see bresson 2007, 175, discussing IG XII, 9 191.
52 E.g., I.Priene 8, line 32; I.Magnesia 6, line 21.
53 Cf. hatzoPoulos 1991, 440.
54 For Macedonia, see also the evidence of the acts of sale published by hatzoPoulos (1996, 
83) from Phillipi and Amphipolis (hatzoPoulos 1991). In the case of Phillipi, the city collects 
the epônion. The dossier from Amphipolis shows no change in the way the city taxed sale after the 
Macedonian conquest.
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remnants of the public archive from Sardis, where we happen to know that a 
famous royal document relating to a sale of land was stored, the situation in 
Lydia might look much more like Mesopotamia.55 Yet in the well-studied cor-
pus of inscriptions that record negotiations between cities and kings over fis-
cal privileges, the issue of sales tax is conspicuously absent. It does not seem 
to have been on the table. Moreover, cities that were firmly embedded within 
a kingdom and subordinated to royal fiscal authority could still bestow the gift 
of full immunity from sales tax. This is what happened in Ilion at the end of 
the fourth century, when the city honored three foreigners from Tenedos by 
decreeing that whoever bought and sold with them did so tax-free.56 Ilion’s 
decree lacks the sort of provisos that we know from ateleia documents from 
elsewhere, which hint at unforeseen taxes over which the city is not sovereign 
(kyrios) and thus cannot include in a blanket grant.57 In short, sales tax was a 
relatively minor category of royal fiscality.58
Part II, “access”
For its part, one of the most important ways in which the polis shaped sale 
was by charging an entrance fee to sellers who wanted access to those cir-
cumscribed and regulated spaces where sale took place. In Magnesia-on-the-
Maeander, for example, wool-sellers were charged an obol a day to enter such 
a space.59 These fees, however, do not fit neatly into our fiscal vocabulary.60 
But they were a fundamental, perhaps even under-appreciated, aspect of sale 
in ancient Greece. To take just one famous text, the Delian Law on Charcoal 
and Wood, the agoranomoi on the island were obligated to penalize the tax 
immune for non-compliance by charging them a standard one drachma per 
day for space in the agora (misthos tou topou).61 As a source of revenue, this 
fee was so common that it could even go by the simple name agorastikon – or 
55 On the Sardis archive, see caPdetrey 2007, 320, discussing OGIS 225.
56 Syll.3 355.
57 E.g., I.Iasos 18, line 9; or SEG 35,1085, lines 30-31, from Apollonia Salbake. In both cases, the 
phrase is: ἀτέλειαν πάντων ὧν ἡ πόλις κυρία, “immunity from all those taxes over which the city 
has sovereignty.”
58 Cf. chanKoWsKI 2007, 323.
59 I.Magnesia 121. Different sellers are charged different daily rates. The preserved text does not 
name the space of sale.
60 chanKoWsKI 2007, 313 arrives at a kind of aporia. She uses the terms “taxes d’usage” and 
“taxes commerciales,” which get closest to the phenomenon. 
61 I.Delos 509, lines 40-42.
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fall under the heading of agoraia telê, familiar from the Oikonomika of Ps. – 
Aristotle.62
The question is whether the monarchies too sold this access, and here a 
modest royal role is evident, which we should be careful not to overstate. 
The key text is the Second Letter of Antiochos III to Sardis of 213 B.C.E., in 
which the king removed certain burdens imposed as punishment for Sardis’ 
support of Achaios in a Seleukid dynastic war, while also restoring cer-
tain privileges. The relevant passage reads: ἀπολύομεν δὲ ὑμᾶς καὶ τοῦ 
ἐνοικίου οὗ τελεῖτε ἀπὸ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις 
μὴ πράσσοντα̣ι. “We release you from the enoikion that you pay on the er-
gastêria, since the other cities do not pay it.”63 A rent of some kind was raised 
“on the ergastêria.” Following Philippe Gauthier in the ed. pr.64, many have 
imagined these ergastêria to have belonged to a stoa built and in fact owned 
by the king, (for which there is no textual or archaeological evidence), going 
so far as to posit a entire class of royal stoas in the agoras of cities. This theory 
gives the kings a much larger role in shaping the space of sale than the Sardis 
letter merits, and in some versions can even imply that the kings built the stoas 
in order to generate transactions that they then taxed.65 It is just as likely that 
these ergastêria were impermanent structures, like the kind of space that was 
sold to vendors at festivals (skênai, vel sim.).66 The Sacred Law of Andania, 
for example, emphasizes that vendors are not be charged for such space, im-
plying that the norm was indeed to take a fee.67 In sum, the Sardis text does not 
show that kings created spaces for sale in order to serve their own fiscality, but 
rather that under certain conditions, in this case punitive ones, but likely also 
the special conditions of a festival, the king might claim the right to charge for 
access to the privileged spaces of sale.
62 IG II2 1245 lines 8-9 and I.Rhamnous 7, lines 10-12, with commentary of Petrakos: φόρος 
αδείας πωλήτου στην αγορά; for agoraia telê as charge for access to space of sale, an excellent 
illustration can be found in clause 11 of RC 3, the letter of Antigonos I to Teos and Lebedos. 
63 SEG 39,1287, lines 8-10.
64 GauthIer 1989b, 101-7.
65 From the standpoint of euergetism, it is also problematic. In other words, when kings and private 
benefactors built stoas, they dedicated them along with the revenues they produced to the city or to a 
divinity. They renounced their future property rights.
66 See the definition of hellmann 1992, 139-40.
67 LSCG 65, line 101. 
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Part III, “mobIlIty In the servIce of sale”
 
Both the letter of Zeuxis to Herakleia-under-Latmos and the grants of Cas-
sander to Chairephanes, as well as to Perdiccas, raise the specter of sale in the 
context of customs. These documents reflect customs regimes that registered 
the intentions of voyagers to sell. In fact, they expose the most salient and 
novel feature of sale in a Hellenistic kingdom. As composite states made up 
of a plurality of smaller polities, these kingdoms were crisscrossed by a series 
of internal customs boundaries, some manned by royal officials, but others 
by the taxmen of poleis, ethnê, and dêmoi. A trader might very well enter 
the customs zone of the basileia directly from the outside, but to move about 
within the kingdom, he was obligated to cross further customs boundaries, 
not all of which were royal.68 No single customs regime reigned supreme. For 
the Seleukid kingdom, this patchwork vision was argued for already by Elias 
Bikerman, while for the Attalid kingdom, we now have the evidence of the 
Customs Law of Asia.69
The manner in which mobility across these boundaries in the service of 
sale was taxed was not new. It conformed to the customs habits of the classi-
cal city-state. The kingdoms took over from the world of the polis the crucial 
distinction between, on the one hand, goods for “personal use (idia chrêsis, 
vel sim.)” or “for possession (epi ktêsei, vel sim.),” and on the other hand, 
those “for sale (ep’ emporiai, vel sim.),” or those “to be manufactured into 
other marketable goods (ep’ ergasiai).”70 This basic distinction was opera-
tive both in Herakleia-under-Latmos, (ἐπὶ τὰς ἰδίας χρείας καὶ εἰς πρᾶσιν 
ἀτελεῖς ὦσιν), and in Cassandreia (πλὴν ὅσα ἐπ’ ἐμπορίαι).71 Further, the 
Herakleia text demonstrates that this distinction mattered within the political 
68 For direct entrance to the fiscal territory of the kingdom from the outside, see the privileges 
granted on goods from the Milesia by Antiochos IV (SEG 36,1046). 
69 bIcKerman 1938, 115-17. Customs Law of Asia: cottIer et al. 2008, lines 26-27. For the 
Antigonid kingdom, we simply lack the evidence. hatzoPoulos 1996, 440-42, summarizes the 
problem. We know that the Macedonian cities possessed their own revenues, which seem to have 
been significant. Yet we have only the epônion of Phillipi on record as a civic tax (hatzoPoulos 
1996, 83). The admittedly tentative conclusion of Hatzopoulos that the royal treasury controlled the 
entire customs regime of the kingdom is suspect in light of the comparative evidence.
70 For the distinction and its ubiquity, see bresson 2008, 77-83. The grant to Chairephanes is his 
locus classicus; for ep’ergasiai see W. JudeIch, MDAI(A) 16 (1891), 292-93,17 lines 13-16.
71 In the case of Perdiccas, I much prefer the standard translation of ἐπὶ κτήσει to that of 
thonemann 2009, 365, “things on his property.” Thonemann would make of Perdiccas’ estate a 
kind of customs shelter within the territory of the polis of Cassandreia. The issue, I think, is the usual 
one: crossing a customs boundary with large amounts of goods raised eyebrows. Perdiccas was given 
the right to declare such goods “for his own possession,” which is indeed another way of saying “for 
his estate.” Cf. the pairing of ktêsis and chrêsis in a decree of Odessos, IG.Bulg. I2, 42 bis, line 6.
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boundaries of the kingdom. It was at issue when the merchant crossed the cus-
toms boundary between royal land and polis territory (οἱ ἐξάγοντες ἐκ τῆς 
τοῦ βασιλέως εἰς τὴν πόλιν).72
Thus what was startlingly new was the proliferation of these checks. The 
map of sale proper to these kingdoms would then have been dotted with check-
points where the following questions would have been asked of royal subjects 
and privileged outsiders: “Who are you?” “Are these goods for personal use 
or for sale?” In a world of city-states alone, this question had been asked of 
foreign individuals who had proxeny or isoteleia rights that entitled them to 
declare their goods “not for sale.” It would have been asked most often of a 
city’s own citizens. To enter, one declared, “I am a citizen, and these are my 
goods for personal use.” The Herakleia text implies that an analogous declara-
tion will have been made both at the initial entry point into the kingdom and 
in fact at each boundary of chôra basileôs: “I am of this basileia, and these 
are my goods for personal use.” Normally, for the Herakleot, this declaration 
would have been made several times over during the course of a journey from 
the Hellespont or central Anatolia to his home polis. Of course, if the ambas-
sadors of Herakleia had been successful in their petition, (as it is hinted in the 
fragmentary final lines of the inscription that they were), at least in the case 
of grain destined for sale in Herakleia, the question of intent to sell ceased 
to matter for the purposes of taxation. Yet the general pattern of questioning 
mattered a great deal.
The practice of investigating economic agents in this manner, of habitually 
forcing them to declare themselves as subjects of the kingdom before royal 
tax collectors, will have engendered new identities and contributed to the con-
struction of a royal subject. Historiographically, it has been much easier to 
detect polis and ethnic identities in this period. Close attention to this aspect 
of sale may serve to encourage a broader search for royal identities. Moreo-
ver, it may be that under the rubric “personal use” much more was moving 
about and moving farther tax-free. This may have led to the integration of 
regional economies, especially if the smaller polities of the kingdom followed 
the kings’ lead and extended this courtesy to each other. All we know for sure 
is that we have a new factor that went into the decision-making process for 
those who would set out from home with a material assemblage or in search 
of one. Finally, we must ask how this distinction between use-goods and sale-
goods was made in practice. Our evidence from the polis is actually rich on 
this score: by means of quantity limits, e.g., one can bring in 100 medimnoi 
72 SEG 37,859 N III, lines 7-9.
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of grain per year;73 by means of oaths, e.g., one vows, “I swear that this is all 
for my personal use”;74 and, just as importantly, by means of trust. The prolif-
eration of these checks on mobility will have been followed by the prolifera-
tion of all of these conventions. This encounter with the royal state will have 
spread knowledge about administrative practices; and it will have given royal 
officialdom a profound knowledge of local economic patterns – which kinds 
of mobility were normal and which raised eyebrows. What appears at first 
glance to be another layer of fragmentation may have lent these Hellenistic 
kingdoms a coherence so far unnoticed.
conclusIon
The goal here has been to define as carefully as possible the royal role in shap-
ing sale in the Hellenistic monarchies outside of Egypt. To that end, the pur-
ported testimonia for sales tax in particular have been subjected to scrutiny. In 
the context of the polis, a specifically royal sales tax is difficult to discern; it 
is certainly more elusive than one has acknowledged. Yet we can look to the 
cases of Toriaion and its agoranomia, along with Cassandreia and the ateleia 
of Chairephanes, in order to appreciate the power of the king to intervene 
in this domain of fiscality and to curb the city’s sovereignty. As Veronique 
Chankowski has shown, the categories of fiscality in ancient Greece were 
mutually constituted and shared between city, temple, and crown.75 Howev-
er, in practice, the monarchies seem to have ceded to the cities the power to 
tax the sale transaction. If the interpretation offered here of Herakleia’s τοῦ 
πωλουμένου is correct, sales tax is not documented as a subject of nego-
tiation between city and king. Of course, when monarchs dealt with subjects 
through the intermediary of strong temple institutions, either in rural Anatolia 
or in urban Mesopotamia, different possibilities presented themselves. Mov-
ing forward from these conclusions, it was suggested that much is to be gained 
by focusing on different aspects of sale, for which the royal role may have 
been more significant. Indeed, a focus on the regulation of access to the privi-
leged spaces of sale, as well as movement in and out of those spaces, makes 
defining the royal role in sale a central task for those who wish ultimately to 
reach a better definition of the Hellenistic kingdom as a form of state.
73 I.Aeg.Thrace 8.
74 Syll.3 633, lines 78-79.
75 chanKoWsKI 2007, 323; chanKoWsKI 2008.
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